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I. Introduction
In recent years there has been increased recognition of the potential importance of the fact
that households  are composed of groups of individuals, each with his or her own set of
preferences. While collective households can be treated for some purposes as if each were each a
single agent with well defined preferences and constraints, it is well known that in some
circumstances predictions based on collective behavior differ substantially from those that would
arise from a unitary model. Moreover, there is a significant body of recent empirical work
reporting results that appear to be inconsistent with the unitary model (e.g., Browning et al 1994;
Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990; Udry 1995).
A striking feature of most if not all of these studies is that the composition of the
household is taken as given. While this might be a reasonable simplification if the results rested
primarily on sources of variation in household characteristics over which members have little
choice such as the sex or endowments of their offspring, in fact most of these studies rely
primarily on variation in the characteristics of spouses, something over which households have a
great deal of control. 
The fact that attributes of spouses may be endogenously determined along with other
household choices has significant implications for the analysis and interpretation of household
behavior (e.g., Lam and Schoeni (1993), Schultz (1990)). A man, for example, with unobservable
characteristics predisposing him to want educated children may choose an educated wife; thus
the wife's schooling may appear to influence child's schooling net of the husband’s observable
characteristics even if, for the same man, changes in wife's schooling would not affect theSchultz (1990) clearly articulates the need to draw identification restrictions explicitly
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from models of marriage market structure but, given the absence of appropriate data, uses
functional form restrictions to determine whether marriage-market selection bias underlies
distinct effects of husband’s and wife’s unearned income on fertility and child health.  The 
relevant work on marriage markets (e.g., Bergstrom and Lam 1993) does not consider the
implications of the marriage market for human capital investment. Although Boulier and
Rosenzweig (1984) does consider the relationship between schooling investment and marriage
market behavior in the presence of unobservables, the focus is on the endogeneity of schooling
choice with respect to prospects in the marriage market. While the implications of marriage-
market selectivity for fertility behavior are also examined briefly, identification rests on the
untested assumption that there is no unobserved heterogeneity in male characteristics. Boulier
and Rosenzweig do not explicitly  model the structure of the marriage market and the
aggregation of individual preferences within the household.
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education of the resulting children. Conversely, the effects of male schooling might be
overestimated if women with a high taste for schooling tend to choose educated husbands. Not
only might these sources of bias lead to inappropriate targeting of educational resources but
could lead to misleading inferences about the extent to which household behavior conforms with
the unitary model.
The main barrier to understanding how the process of partner selection influences
household behavior is that in order to measure and properly control for the endogeneity of the
choice of partners it is necessary to know a great deal about the operation of marriage markets at
the time and place in which a given marriage takes place.  Because marriages relevant to the
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typical targets of household surveys will have taken place a number of years before the survey
and little information is likely to be available regarding the set of potential partners, few data sets
have sufficient information to support an analysis of the implications of marriage-market
selection for household behaviors of interest.
In this paper I examine the implications of marriage-market selection for human capital
formation using a unique data set from rural Bangladesh that contains longitudinal information3
on marriage in a population of approximately 200,000 people over a period of 15 years that can
be linked to censuses containing information on the households of origin of both spouses as well
as information on schooling aspirations for children resulting from these marriages. I develop a
model of the marriage market that incorporates the assumption that human capital investment in
children is a public good within marriage and makes use of the equilibrium condition that, given
transferable utility, the marriage allocations that take place at a given place and time  must
maximize total utility. 
Because the model does not lend itself to the development of analytic expressions for
purpose of estimation but can be readily simulated, a three-stage simulation procedure is used.
First, parameter estimates based on an approximate but incorrectly specified econometric model
are compared to parameter estimates from the same model applied to simulated data in order to
establish that the incorrectly specified model provides a reasonable approximation to the true
model. Second, residuals from the simulated data are used to estimate the bias likely to arise in
estimates of human capital decision rules as a consequence of the covariances induced by the
marriage selection process between observable (to the econometrician) attributes of individuals
and the unobservable attributes of their spouses. Third, regression equations relating these
residuals to the attributes of the couples participating in each marriage market in the simulated
data are used to construct the predicted values of the male and female endowments conditional
on a given marriage taking place in a given marriage market. Incorporation of these predicted
values into desired schooling decision rules yields selection-corrected estimates of the effects of
male and female characteristics on desired schooling. The resulting coefficients along with the
bias estimates are shown to be mutually consistent. Simulations indicate that these consistency4
checks would have been violated under a particular form of model misspecification that results in 
incorrect predictions regarding the correlation between observables and unobservables. Thus the
approach appears to capture the essential aspects of marriage-market selection in the study
population. 
The results provide evidence that marriage-market selection is significant. I find that the
uncorrected estimates tend to overstate the effects of male characteristics on desired schooling by
35-55% while understating the effects of female characteristics by 13-16%, with the higher
percentage biases with regard to the male characteristics arising when a limited set of female
characteristics are used in the analysis. These results suggest that unobservable variation in
female income and/or tastes is the primary source of selectivity bias in this population. Although
the finding that selectivity is important indicates that tests rejecting the unitary model that do not
control for selectivity bias should be interpreted with caution, the approach underlying these
results illustrates clearly the significance of the broader perspective on household behavior
offered by the collective model.
II. Model
In order to accurately assess the implications of marriage selectivity for measuring the
effects of spouses’ characteristics on household behaviors such as human capital investment in
children it is necessary to construct a model of the marriage market that explicitly incorporates
parental decision making about the allocation of resources. In particular, because in contrast to
many other forms of expenditure such as that on calories, human capital investment in children isIn the presence of altruism individual caloric intake may also have a significant public-
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good component. The main point here is that investment in children is likely to be considered
more of a public good from the perspective of the parents than is caloric intake.
Extension of the model to allow for multiple children complicates the notation but does
3
not affect the empirical implications that are used below.
Note that an increase in g increases human capital acquisition: the optimal level of
4
human capital acquisition for a single parent of sex s with taste parameter g and a child of sex z
s sz s h s is linear and increasing in g: h=(0y+  * + "g)/(20p+ ").
5
(1)
likely to contribute directly to the utility of both partners,  I construct a marriage-market model
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that focuses on the provision of public goods within marriage similar to that used by Bergstrom
and Lam (1993).
Specifically, I assume that each individual i of sex s entering the marriage market may be
characterized by his or her income and his or her tastes for schooling.  After partners are chosen
through the marriage market, each couple has one child  whose sex becomes known at birth. The
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couple then allocates total income to private consumption for the two parents and to human
capital acquisition h for the child.
The utility that is realized by each member is assumed to be quadratic in the human
capital h provided to the child and linear, given h,  in own private consumption c: 
where s = {M,F} (for male and female, respectively) denotes the sex of the parent, z the sex of
sz s the child, g is an index of the individual’s taste for human capital,  and *  and " >0 are taste
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parameters. A key feature of (1) is that it implies that households exhibit transferable utilityNecessary and sufficient conditions for transferable utility in the present context given
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interior solutions are that preferences may be characterized as u(c,h;s,z,g)=q(h,z)c+r(h,s,z,g) for
arbitrary functions q and r (see Bergstrom and Cornes (1981, 1983)). Aside from functional form
the primary restrictions that are being made are that z is excluded from q() and only allowed to
affect the linear coefficient on h in r(). Note that these restrictions are only  necessary for the
analysis because equation (1) allows both tastes and income to affect human capital decisions. If
ss 0 =0 then "  may be allowed to depend on z and if either " =0 or there is no variation in g then 0
may be allowed to depend on z without changing the basic structure of the model.
6
(2)
which implies, “Roughly speaking...that utility within the household can be ‘redistributed’, like
apples or bananas. If one distribution of utility is possible then so is any other distribution of
utilities where individual utilities sum to the same number.” (Bergstrom 1995, p7). While this
functional form is more restrictive than necessary for transferable utility  it is analytically
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convenient and complex enough to capture key features of the choice between public and private
consumption faced by multiple person households given heterogeneity in tastes and income.
A significant implication of the fact that this function exhibits transferable utility is that,
for given incomes and tastes, all Pareto efficient allocations within the household will yield the
same level of human capital investment, with different points on the Pareto frontier
corresponding to differences in how private consumption is divided within the household.
ij (Bergstrom 1995) Thus the optimal level of human capital investment h  for a couple composed
Mi Mi Fj Fj of male i, with income y  and tastes g  and female j with income y and tastes g , who have  a
child of sex z can be determined by maximizing the sum of the couple’s utilities with respect to h
 Mi Fj and total consumption c=c +c .7
(3)
(4)
subject to the household budget constraint
h where p  is the unit cost of human capital. The optimal level of h if the child is sex z is thus
si s si si where k =" g+ 0 y . Evaluating (2) at the optimal levels of human capital and total consumption
yields the sum of the couple’s utilities conditional on the sex of their offspring. Taking
expectations with respect to the sex of the child yields the total expected marital utility accruing
ij to the couple if i marries j, which will be denoted U . 
It is worth noting that  equation (4) yields the standard neoclassical prediction that has
been used to test the unitary model (e.g., Schultz 1990), that male and female income effects on
household behavior should be equal. Thus, even in a setting in which collective behavior is
important one might not find evidence inconsistent with unitary behavior to the extent that
transferable utility holds and the outcome in question relates to a public good. Equation (4)
illustrates as well a second problem with tests of the unitary model using unearned income.
Given that family background characteristics that determine unearned income such as parental
wealth may affect tastes as well as income, a test of the equality of male and female income
si effects that does not adequately control for heterogeneity in tastes g  could lead one to incorrectly
reject the predictions of the unitary model.
Under the assumed model structure, efficient allocations in the marriage market require In particular, this property follows from the assumption that, given the level of the public
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good, utility is linear in consumption. It is worth noting, however, that the key empirical
implication derived using this property, that there is positive assortative mating on the index k,
does not depend on this particular form: in the presence of transferable utility there is a unique
efficient set of marriage-market allocations with this property (Bergstrom 1995)
s si si Note that if " =0 then k =y  and thus there will be positive assortative mating on income
7




the total sum of utilities across all couples in the marriage market to be maximized (Becker
1974).  Henceforth assume that men and women in a given marriage market are ordered so that
6
man i marries woman i. Then, efficient allocation of marital partners dictates that for any two
couples, i and j, that are part of the same marriage market,
That is, total utility cannot be increased by having these two couples exchange partners. By
ij substituting the expressions for the U  into (5) and solving one obtains
ij s si sj where ) k =k -k .  Equation (6) simply states that the marriage market should yield positive
assortative mating on the index k, which is a linear combination of income and tastes: within a
given marriage market the male with the highest value of this index should be matched with the
female with the highest value of this index and so forth.  The intuition for the result is
7
straightforward: because not providing children the desired level of human capital investment
from the perspective of each spouse is costly and because each member of the couple must
consume the same amount of this public good, welfare is maximized by coupling individualsDifferences in residual variance are introduced in this way to emphasize the fact that, as
8
with other limited dependent variable techniques, the first stage of the analysis discussed below




with similar incomes and tastes for human capital investment. 
  Equations (4) and (6) can be used to characterize  marriage-market selection bias in a
setting in which, as one might one expect in general, one does not fully observe the set of
characteristics that contribute to variation in income and tastes. Specifically, for each sex s, let
si s s  si s si si k= ($ x+ (, where ,  is a mean zero unobserved component of the male taste index that is
’
si s s uncorrelated with x , (  is a scalar that determines the variance of the residual term,  $  is a
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si vector of known coefficients, and x  denotes the vector of observable (to the econometrician)
characteristics of the i  individual of sex i. Thus the human capital allocation equation (4) for
th
offspring of couple i (i.e., of male i and female i ) is 
where  and  . It is evident that OLS
estimation of equation (7) will yield biased estimates of   to the extent that the observable
ss i components of the income/taste indices, $ 'x , are correlated with the unobservable components,
si , . Although by assumption  , it is likely that
and  as a consequence of the sorting in the marriage market: positive assortative
Fi mating on the index k will ensure that between, for example, two women with the same x   the
Fi woman with the higher unobserved component ,  will marry, given two potential grooms, that
Mi M Mi  groom with the higher k , which is likely to be the man with the higher $ ’x .For notational simplicity the following expressions abstract from the fact that the
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constant   may depend on the sex of the child. Assuming the sex of children is orthogonal to the





With sufficient information on the above covariances it is in general possible  to assess
the magnitude of and to adjust for the bias associated with marriage-market selection. In
M Mi F Fi Mi Fi i particular, let the column vectors k =[$ ’x , $ ’x , , , , ] ,  , and  where
ii  and  are the estimates of   and  obtained by regressing h  on the predicted taste
MM i FF i indices  $ ’x  and $ ’x  and sex.  Further, let
9
xx i denote the variance-covariance matrix of the k, where E  is the 2x2 matrix covariance matrix of
the predicted indices for men and women, and so forth. The bias then may be characterized using
the following expression
Solving for  yields
where I is the 2x2 identify matrix. This formula shows how a consistent estimate of E may be
used to construct consistent estimates of   using biased OLS coefficients.
Further restrictions are required to obtain predictions about the signs of these biases. In
x, the special case, for example, in which there is no variance in the unobservable for men E  will,Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) do use marriage-market characteristics to instrument
10
the husbands’ wage in a fertility decision rule. This process works for their model because, as
noted, the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be one sided (i.e., the only husband’s attribute
that is assumed to be valued in the marriage market is his wage). 
11
asymptotically, have only one non-zero element, the covariance of the male predicted index and
the female unobservable. Under these circumstances it may be shown that the biases will have
opposite signs:   will overestimate   but   will underestimate  .
III. Estimation
While the fact that the regressors in the human capital allocation equation (7) are
correlated with the residual suggests that estimation of this equation might take place using
instrumental variables, the structure of the model indicates that no appropriate instruments are
likely to be available. In particular, although the fact that the distribution of potential partners
influences the choice of spouse might lead one to believe that measures of this distribution could
serve as instruments, this is not the case because the  unobserved components are known by the
marriage-market participants at the time of marriage--as the marriage-market does not distinguish
the observed and unobserved components of tastes, any variable that is correlated with the former
will also be correlated with the latter and thus with the residual in (7).   I consequently make use
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of an alternative procedure, which in a manner analogous to the Heckman (1979) two-step
selectivity correction, includes as a regressor in (7) an estimate of the conditional expectation of
the residual term. 
The first stage of the analysis is to estimate the equations determining the structure of the
marriage market. These equations play the role of the first-stage equation in standard selectivity
correction methods: in effect the marriage-market equations determines which among all possible12
(11)
(12)
spouse combinations at a given time and place actually result in marriages.  Consider first a
marriage market consisting of only two men and two women.  The probability that the first and
second men will marry the first and second women, respectively, conditional on the observables
s  si si $ ’x , and assuming that the ,  are drawn independently from an extreme-value distribution, is 
12 M M2 M1 where ) x =x -x , and so forth. Note that (12) has two additive components reflecting the
fact that the “ones” will marry each other if either both of them have higher tastes for schooling
than do the “twos” or if they both have lower tastes than do the “twos”. Note also that because
si the x  variables only enter in differenced form the specification is robust to the inclusion of
marriage-market specific fixed effects that might arise, for example, if the mean of the
si distribution of the ,  varied across markets. 
If there were a large number of distinct separate markets with two men and women each,
s maximum likelihood estimates of $  could be obtained by taking logs of (12),  summing over
markets, and optimizing. In practice, given the criterion used to define marriage markets, asThis follows from the facts that in equilibrium the rank order of the men will equal the
11
rank order of their wives and that n items may be ranked in n factorial different ways.
The source of the error in the approximation here is that it asserts incorrectly that man
12
M1 Mi F1 Fj. one will marry woman one whenever there exists some i>1 and j>1 such that k <k  and k <k




discussed below, there are likely to be more than two marriages taking place in each market.
Unfortunately, however, generalizing equation (12) to the presence of more than two potential
t marriage partners is not straightforward because, when there are N couples in a marriage market, 
t there are N! ways that a given set of marriage allocations can arise.  Therefore, in the analysis
11
that follows I make use of an approximate procedure in which each of the binomial logit
M1 2 m probabilities (e.g., 1/(1+exp(-$ ‘) x ))) in (12) is replaced with its multinomial logit analog 
M1 2 m (e.g., 1/(1+Eexp(-$ ‘) x )) . Thus the criterion function that is maximized to obtain
12
coefficient estimates for the taste parameters is:
t where N denotes the number of marriages taking place in marriage market t and T is the total
number of marriage markets observed. Although this criterion function does not conform exactly
to the structure of the model, it yields reasonable parameter estimates, as shown below, in the
sense that estimated parameters obtained using simulated data do not differ significantly fromThe approach could be made to yield consistency by (1) restricting analysis to two-
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couple marriage markets (2) selecting the parameters used to generate the simulated data to
minimize the distance between the estimates from the actual and simulated data. This latter
approach, which is known as indirect inference,  has been formally characterized by Gourieroux
et al. (1983). Because, as will be shown, the distance is small when the actual parameters are
used to to simulate the data, any changes due to adoption of this procedure would likely be small. 
Note that in the context of the present model this approach is identical to that that would
14
be obtained by solving a linear program in which the objective function coefficients are the
marital surplus generated when male i marries female j.
14
those used to generate the simulated data.
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The simulated data were constructed to correspond as closely as possible to the actual
s data set given the assumed model. Estimates of $  obtained through the maximization of (13),
si si actual values of the x ,  and errors ,  drawn from an extreme-value distribution were used to
assign to each man and woman in a given marriage market measures of his or her taste cum
s Mi s si si income index under the assumption that ( =1 : k =$ 'x +,  . Men and women in each marriage
si market were then matched by ranking members of each sex by their respective simulated k
Mi Fj values so that the man with the highest k  was matched with the woman with the higest k  and
so forth.
14
  The third stage of the analysis involves estimation of equation (7) by first constructing
si predicted values of the ,  given marriage market structure and the actual matching that takes
place. While analytic expressions for these measures are, to my knowledge, unavailable, it is
possible to generate numerical estimates using the simulated data. As with the bias correction
discussed above, the idea is that the relationship between the observables and unobservables in
the actual data can be understood by examining the relationships in the simulated data. In
ss i i particular, let w denote a vector consisting of summary statistics of the predicted indices ($ 'x )si The use of the expression 8  is deliberately evocative of the inverse Mill's ratio used in
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standard selection corrections that assume normal errors (Heckman 1979). Identification of this
term comes from the fact that the distribution of marriage-market characteristics does not affect
ii h  except through the allocation of partners, which is in turn a result of the transferable utility
si assumption. Note, however, that in contrast to the usual approach, the 8  here are not in general
consistent estimates of conditional expectations of the shocks and the actual and predicted errors
ii do not have a joint normal distribution. Thus the v  are uncorrelated but not in general
i independent of w . By implication, for example, using non-uniform weights to estimate (14)
could yield inconsistent parameters estimates.
15
(14)
in a given market (mean and standard deviations separately for women and men and the number
, of marriages) , the predicted indices of male and female i all second order interactions. By
ii regressing the vector k on w in the simulated data and applying the resulting vector of
ii coefficients to the vector w in the actual data one obtains a predicted value,   of the vector k .
ss i Because the $ 'x  are included in the list of instruments, the first two elements of   are simply
s si Mi Fi Mi Fi., the $ 'x  . The second two elements, call them 8  and 8  , are predicted values of ,  and ,
ii respectively. Regression of h  on  , that is estimation of the equation, 
yields consistent estimates of the vector  , as shown in Appendix A.   This procedure will
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subsequently be identified as the selection-correction procedure, as distinguished from the bias
correction procedure (equation (10)). 
;IV. Data
The data used in this paper are constructed from the records of the Demographic
Surveillance System (DSS) of the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research in
Bangladesh (ICDDRB) as well as a survey of educational attainment and aspirations in 1990. 
The population consists of 164,000 people (as of 1974) in 149 spatially contiguous villages inOver the 1974-1990 period there are a number of instances in which multiple marriages
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are reported for the same individual. These records likely reflect (1) cases in which marriage
records were available from both the husband's and the wife's households but were reported in
somewhat different time periods (2) some cases in which marriage was never actually
consummated (as a result, for example, of the failure of one party to meet their terms of the
dowries) (3) remarriage, primarily by divorced or widowed men. In order to avoid the complexity
associated with modeling these outcomes, it was decided to focus only on the first reported
marriage for each woman. Marriages other than the first were included for men if they occurred
more than two years following the initial marriage. 
The specific criterion used was that the individual recorded in a given marriage record
17
must have appeared as a single individual in some household in the study area in either the 1975
or 1982 census before the time of marriage. This is reasonable criterion because single
individuals are likely to remain resident with parents or older siblings until marriage (see, e.g.,
Foster 1990). 
16
Matlab Upazilla, which is a rural riverine area. Individual-level, longitudinally collected birth,
death and migration registration data are available for all residents of the villages starting in
1966, and all marriage information is available after 1975. Censuses were carried out in 1974 and
1982 and these provide information on household structure, education,  and resource availability
that can be linked to the individual-level vital events using a permanent individual identification
number.
Marriage records are filed for anyone living in the study area at the time of marriage.
These records report individual identification numbers on both partners as well as information on
age, education and occupation. In this study I make use of the marriage records between 1975
and 1990. During this period there were 44,886 unique marriage records reported,  and of these
16
marriages 45% of husbands and 58% of wives could be linked to their original households.  
17
The 1990 survey consists of a 30% sample of women from 1/3 of the 149 villages in the
study area.  In addition to collecting standard demographic information, the survey obtained
information on the level and desired schooling for each of a woman’s children under 15.I will assume, for purpose of exposition, that "desired schooling" can be substituted for
18
"achieved schooling" in the estimation of equation (4). An alternative and perhaps  more
reasonable assumption is  that desired schooling corresponds to the level of schooling that a child
h would receive if schooling were costless (p =0). Under this assumption the interpretation of the 
ratios of the  would be unaffected. 
17
Although this follow-up survey on a population with detailed marriage information is unique
with regard to its ability to address issues of marriage selectivity, it is not ideal. In particular, to
estimate the model one needs a measure of human capital investment such as schooling or body
size of children for all married women. Unfortunately, no anthropometric information was
collected in the survey and over half of the sample of women married over the vital registration
period did not have a school-aged child by the time of the survey. I therefore use as the human
capital measure data on desired schooling, which are reported for all of a woman’s children
regardless of age.
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The initial stage of data preparation involved grouping the marriage records for the 149
villages over the 15-year period into distinct marriage markets. In a setting in which men and
women marry others in the same village at a fixed age this would be straightforward: one could
take all marriages in a given village and year as constituting a single marriage market. In fact,
however, although a significant fraction of individuals marry others in the same region, men and
women from the same village are unlikely to marry. Not only does this imply that the availability
of marriage partners in one village may importantly affect outcomes in other villages, but given
that household data are only available for residents of the study area, it also means that
information is incomplete on a significant fraction of spouses.
Because the extent to which marriage-market selection bias afflicts analyses of household
behavior depends, among other things, on the extent to which men and women have a choiceNote that the inclusion in the marriage market of only those couples in which both
19
partners are from the study area substantially reduces the average size of the marriage market. If
the sample were restricted to those couples for which only the bride was from the study area there
would have been 11.7 marriages per market. However, if this latter criterion had been used
analysis of marriage market allocations would have been limited to consideration of the variables
available on the marriage-market records.
18
over the characteristics of their spouses, there are costs to choosing both too broad and too
narrow a definition of a single marriage market. If one includes in the marriage market too few
individuals relative to the relevant choice set then estimates of the correlation between
observables and unobservables will be too small (e.g., it will be zero if there are no alternative
potential spouses) and thus the bias computed using equation (10) will in general also be too
small. On the other hand,  if one includes in the marriage market potential partners that were not,
in fact, part of the choice set  one will tend to overestimate the extent of bias. 
Given the structure of the available data and because the primary purpose of this paper is
to establish whether marriage-market selection is present at all  it is desirable to err on the side of
underestimating the size of the relevant choice set. Therefore  it is assumed that a marriage
market consists of all single women from the same village who marry an individual from within
the study area in a given year and their grooms. On this basis the 149 villages over a 15 year
period could have had up to 2235 distinct marriage markets; in fact there were 1892. On average
there were 4.2 couples per marriage market with 90% of the marriage markets having less than
10 couples.  Table 1 presents summary statistics from the sample of couples included in the
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marriage-market analysis of the education and ages of the partners and the land ownership and
head’s education for the households in which they resided prior to marriage.  Summary statistics
on the characteristics of the under-15 children from the sub-sample of the 1990 survey womenAllowing for entry and exit from the marriage market would have introduced more than
20
the usual additional complexity because it would have been necessary to characterize how the
distribution of utility within the household is influenced by marriage market structure, something
that can be avoided if marriage market entry is taken as given.
19
that was also included in the marriage-market sample are also presented.
Closely related to the question of what constitutes a marriage market is the question of the
process by which individuals enter the marriage market. Again, the focus of the paper dictates the
use of a simplifying assumption that will tend to err on the side of minimizing the possibility of
finding selection bias. In particular, it is assumed that conditional on the observables for each
individual and a fixed village-level effect, allocation to the marriage market is random so that the
si distribution of the unobserved part of the k  is not influenced by the characteristics of other
marriage market entrants. This assumption minimizes the likelihood of finding selectivity bias by
Mi assuming away the possibility, for example, that men with especially high ,  are more likely to
marry into a given village in a year when the eligible women in that village have high desired
Fi levels of schooling (i.e., high values of k  ). It also rules out the possibility that an individual,
having entered a particular marriage market and observed the attributes of the other entrants,
chooses not to marry and then enters a subsequent marriage market.  While these restrictions are
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non-trivial and the resulting coefficients, particularly those relating to the effects of the
si si characteristics x  on k  , must therefore be interpreted with caution, they yield an estimable
model that appears to capture the essence of the problem of marriage-market selection. 
Moreover, as shown below, the assumptions do not appear to do much violence to the data in the
sense that estimates of the extent of selection bias are internally consistent.
V. Results20
a. Marriage-market allocations
s The first stage of the analysis involves the estimation of the $  coefficients relating
observable characteristics of brides and grooms marrying at particular places and times to the
human-capital tastes indices using equation (13). Table 2 presents the results for two sets of
specifications, each of which is applied to both the actual marriage data and to corresponding
simulated data. The first specification uses the same set of characteristics for men and women:
own education and the landholding and education of the head in the individual’s household of
origin. The coefficients are estimated with a reasonable degree of precision and, for the most
part, are significantly different from zero, indicating that both own characteristics and the
characteristics of one’s household of origin substantially affect one’s choice of spouse. The
results are also remarkably comparable between men and women. For example, for both sexes
land ownership by head of the household in which one resided prior to marriage has a concave
effect on the income-cum-taste, with the effect of a .1 decimal increase in land ownership
evaluated at mean land being .75 and 1.01 for brides and grooms, respectively. 
s Interpretation of these coefficients is difficult because the variance terms (  are not
si identified and because the index k  combines both income and tastes. It would be inappropriate
for two reasons to infer on the basis of these coefficients, for example, that land ownership of
si brides and grooms contribute almost equally to income y  . First, the total effect of land
si ownership on income depends also on the coefficient ( , which has been normalized out of the
si estimated equations. Second, the effect of land ownership on the index k , especially for brides,
may operate primarily through its implications for the bride's taste (or her parents' tastes given
arranged marriage) for schooling.The finding that high index men are likely to seek out women from households with
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educated heads supports the conclusion of Lam and Schoeni (1993) that the strong effects of a
man’s father-in-law’s schooling on his wage  reflects assortative mating. Unfortunately they do
not consider the effects of in-law’s schooling on women’s wages; the findings here suggest that
these effects are likely to be small net of husband’s education.
21
Some insight into the magnitudes of these effects may nonetheless be gained by
considering a hypothetical marriage market in which there are two observationally equivalent (to
the econometrician) males who therefore each have a 50% probability of being matched to the
Fi woman in that market with the higher k , depending on the values of their unobservable
components. Under these circumstances providing one of the males with an increase from the
mean land owned to the mean plus one standard deviation would result in him having an 88% of
being matched with the high-index woman. The schooling effects are of a similar magnitude:
providing one of the males with incomplete (complete) primary schooling would give him a 79%
(97%) probability of being matched with the higher-index woman. Similarly, a one standard
deviation increase in land owned would raise the probability of  an observationally equivalent
woman being matched with the higher taste man from 50% to 79.6%, while providing a woman
with incomplete (complete) primary schooling would yield a 75.8% (89.3%) probability of
attracting that man.   
s The only substantial difference between the men’s and women’s estimated $  coefficients
appears to be in how the head’s schooling is evaluated in the marriage market. In particular, men
with high income/tastes seek out both women who are educated and women who come from
households where the head is educated, while women with a high taste for the public good are
primarily concerned with the schooling of their potential spouse not with that of the head of his
household.
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Because a significant approximation had to be made in order to derive equation (13), it is
important to establish whether the procedure does indeed produce reasonable parameter
estimates.  This was done by applying the procedure used to estimate the coefficients in column 1
to the simulated data set constructed based on these coefficients. The resulting coefficient
estimates are presented in the second column of Table 2 and indicate that the procedure is quite
effective in the sense that the estimates correspond closely to the values of the underlying
parameters that they estimate (i.e., the column 1 parameter estimates).  Not only are the point
estimates and t-ratios quite similar in the two columns, but an overall test that of the hypothesis
that the column (2) parameter estimates are equal to the values used to generate the simulated
12 data indicates the two are not statistically different (P =11.3; P-value=0.5).
2
In order to evaluate the extent of selectivity bias that would arise if only a more limited
set of covariates were available, a second specification, henceforth called the “reduced
specification”,  was estimated that excludes the characteristics of the brides’ households. A
second simulated data set, based on the resulting coefficient estimates, was also constructed. The
resulting estimates are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 and are reasonably
comparable to those provided by the full specification.  As before the estimates based on the
8 actual and simulated data are not significantly different (P =9.8; P-value=0.28).  As might be
2
expected given that schooling is positively associated with land ownership the coefficients on
bride’s schooling increase when schooling is the only available predictor of the brides’ incomes
and tastes. While the increase in the primary schooling coefficient for brides appears reasonable,
the estimated coefficients for secondary schooling are less satisfactory: both increase
dramatically relative to that in the previous specification and the coefficients are estimated veryIn order to make these estimates relevant to those presented in Table 4, these
22
covariances are estimated net of village-level fixed estimates. The consequent removal of the
mean shock by village explains the fact that the estimated variance of the shocks is substantially
less than the true variance of residuals generated from an extreme value distribution (1.64). 
23
imprecisely. This instability likely reflects the  relatively low degree of completed primary
schooling in this population (see Table 1) coupled with the increased importance of education as
an explanatory variable when the brides' household characteristics are excluded.
b. Simulated data covariances
s si si The next step in the analysis is to use the predicted indices  $ ’x , errors , , and
allocations from the simulated model to examine the extent of bias likely to arise in the
estimation of household decision rules given the structure of the model.  As noted, this bias
arises because the process of selection in the marriage market induces a positive correlation
between the male observable and the female unobservable and vice versa. This pattern is clearly
evident in Table 3, which presents the variances and covariances of the relevant variables for the
two simulated data sets.  As expected the correlation between the male and females observables
22
and their respective unobservable components is not significantly different from zero. By contrast
the cross covariances are strongly significant, yielding, for the full specification, a correlation of
.335 between the female residual and the male predicted index and a correlation of .243 between
the male residual and the female predicted index. As expected the reduced specification, by
Fi decreasing the fraction of variation in the index k  attributable to observable characteristics of
the brides, increases the relative importance of the bride’s unobservable as a source of correlation
between bride’s and groom’s indices. In particular, the correlations between the female residual
and the male predicted index in the reduced specification is higher (.344 vs. .335) and theEach of these specifications is estimated using fixed effects for the brides’ villages and
23
includes maternal age and age squared. Hausman tests rejected the random effects specification
in favor of village fixed effects for the selectivity corrected estimates using the full specification
24
opposite cross-correlation is lower (.121 vs. .243). 
The bias adjustment equations based on the respective covariances for the two simulated
data sets and equation (10) are presented in the lower panel of Table 3. As noted these equations
indicate how one can obtain consistent estimates of the underlying parameters given the biased
estimates that will be obtained using OLS. Suppose, for example, that the OLS coefficients
happen to be equal, that is   . Then the equations for the first panel indicates that the OLS
coefficient estimate  overstates the true value of   by 40% while the coefficient 
ss i understates the true value by 12%. Thus even if the effects of the predicted index $ ’x  for
mothers substantially exceeds that for fathers, it may appear that the coefficients are the same if
selectivity is ignored.
The bias-correction formulae for the reduced specification do not differ qualitatively from
those derived for the full specification. In particular assuming equal estimated coefficients as
before we may infer that the OLS estimate   overstates the true value of   by 13% while the
coefficient   understates the true value by only 2%. While it is interesting that these biases are
small, it is worth noting that this conclusion depends significantly on the assumption that the
uncorrected coefficient estimates are equal. If the OLS estimate  were only half that of 
then these equations imply that   would overstate the true value by 35%.
c. Estimates of desired schooling decision rules
Table 4 presents estimates of the desired schooling decision rules (equation (7)) with and
without corrections for marriage-market selectivity.   The first column of numbers presents the
2377 ( P =15.5, P-value=0.03) but not the reduced specification (P =9.14, P-value=0.24) . The
22
maternal age (at the time of the 1990 survey) effects are included to allow for life-cycle effects in
reported desired schooling that do not affect marriage allocations. These effects may also capture
trends in schooling aspirations across cohorts.
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uncorrected estimates obtained by regressing desired schooling on the predicted indices for the
full specification, where the latter were constructed using the corresponding marriage-market
allocation coefficient estimates from Table 2. Interestingly, the coefficients on the male and
female indices are comparable. Indeed, they are not significantly different (P-value=0.51).
s Because the values of the $  obtained from the marriage-market allocation part of the estimation
are also comparable this result seems to suggest that male and female characteristics have similar
effects on desired schooling. For example, taking the marriage market entered by a woman and
her choice of spouse as given, increasing a woman’s schooling from zero to incomplete primary
results in a .480x1.14=.55 year increase in desired schooling; the comparable figure for men is
also .55. 
The exercise carried out in the previous sub-section, however, suggests that these
estimates may be substantially biased. Indeed, application of the formulae presented in Table 3
yields a rather different picture (column 2). While the male coefficient estimate falls relative to
that in column 1 by 35% to .267 the female coefficient estimate rises by 16% to .559. Thus it
appears that the effect of female incomplete primary schooling on desired schooling of children
is about twice that of the effect of male incomplete primary schooling. 
While it is instructive to show that the model, if correct, predicts that there will be
substantial bias in the estimated male and female coefficients, there is reason to question whether
the model conforms sufficiently to the true underlying process that the covariation between theThe estimates are presented in the Appendix B.
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predicted indices and residuals in the simulated data, which may be observed directly, is a
reasonable estimate of that in the actual data. Moreover, even if the resulting covariances are
correctly estimated, the estimated biases may be incorrect if the respective (by sex) residuals and
predicted indices do not have the same coefficient as predicted by the model (equation (7)).
An alternative set of estimates were therefore obtained based on equation (14). The idea,
as noted, is to regress the male and female residuals from the simulated data on a set of marriage
market characteristics given the allocations arising in those data   and then to apply the resulting
24
si coefficients to the same set of statistics in the actual data to obtain the 8 . The third column in
Table 4 presents these estimates. 
The results conform strongly to those presented in the second column.  The estimate of
the male index effect is .246, which is substantially closer to the .267 obtained using the
simulated data covariances than the uncorrected figure of .412. Similarly, the female index effect
is .608 which corresponds to the estimate of .559 obtained using the simulated data covariances.
Moreover, in contrast to the result for the uncorrected estimates, the hypothesis  that the two sets
of coefficients are equal is rejected (P-value=0.03). 
There are several other features of this specification that provide support for the model.
First, the selection-term coefficients are significantly different from zero (P-value=0.06)
indicating that the marriage-market characteristics that influence the allocation of partners in the
simulated data are significantly correlated with the residuals in the desired schooling equation as
they should be given marriage-market selection. Second, the hypothesis that the coefficients on
the respective (by sex) predicted index and selection terms are equal as predicted by the modelAssumptions were designed to conform roughly to the parameter estimates in Table 4.
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Fifty simulations were run for each level of the share of random matching, with each of the
simulations having 4000 marriage markets consisting of two men and two women. Coefficient
27
(equation (14)) is not rejected (P-value=0.61).  By imposing this constraint and reestimating the
model new estimates of the  are obtained (column 4) that conform even more closely to those
s in column (2). Third, the model implies that the relative values of the $  coefficients for a given
sex from the marriage-market specification should equal the relative values of the    that
si would obtain if the corresponding x  were included as regressors in equation (14) instead of the
predicted indices. This latter model was therefore estimated  and the hypothesis tested taking the
s $  from the marriage-market specification as given. The implied constraints were not rejected
10 (P =14.31; P-value=.16). 
2
Given that both the bias correction and selectivity approach make use of information on
simulated residuals it is reasonable to question whether the two approaches can really distinguish
the proposed model from plausible alternatives. Of particular interest is whether misspecification
in the form of incorrect predictions about the correlations between observables and
unobservables, arising, for example from incorrect characterization of the marriage market, will
differentially affect the two measures.
Evidence on this point was obtained by applying the estimation procedures to simulated
data that reflect this potential form of misspecification. In particular, a hypothetical set of
marriage markets, each with only two pairs of partners, were simulated. Couples in a prespecified
fraction of the marriage markets were randomly matched, while those in the remainder of the
si ii markets were sorted according to their respective k  indices. Measures of h  were then simulated
with,  and   set to .2 and .5, respectively.   .  OLS as well as the two forms of corrected
25si estimates are averages across the fifty simulations. For each simulation, individual k  indices
were constructed for each participant by adding together two scaled extreme value distributions,
corresponding to the observable and unobservable components. The extreme value shocks for the
female unobservable was scaled by a factor of .3, while the male unobservable and the
observable for both sexes were scaled by a factor of .1.
si For the purpose of this simulation it is assumed that the $  are known and not estimated.
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si This assumption aids clarity but is potentially misleading because one might expect the $
estimates in practice to be affected by the presence of random matching. Simulations comparable
si to those presented here allowing for estimation of the $  yielded similar results for random
matching probabilities in the range of 0-40%. For higher levels of random matching, however,
si si imprecision in the $  estimates substantially reduced the power of the test. The fact that the $
from the actual data are well measured indicates that random matching, if present at all in 
marriage markets in rural Bangladesh, is in the lower range. 
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estimates were then obtained for the simulated data using only the information on the observable
si component of the k  for each individual in each marriage market, the predicted marriages, and
si the predicted h .    Because the correction procedures incorporates the perfect assortative mating
26
result, they are misspecified whenever some fraction of the marriage markets exhibit random
matching. 
Averages of the resulting coefficient estimates appear in Figure 1. When the simulated
data contain no random matching (i.e., share=0), the OLS estimate for males is quite distant from
its true value, while the bias corrected estimate, for both sexes are very close to their true values
(panel 1). The selection correction estimates (panel 2), show that this procedure also works well
si under this scenario--the average estimates of the  index and the 8  parameters for both sexes
correspond closely to their true values. 
As the share of random matching increases, however, substantial bias afflicts both the
si bias corrected estimate for males in panel 1 and the 8  coefficients in panel 2 for both sexes but
the male and female index coefficients from the selection correction remain largely unaltered.It is easily seen that similar patterns emerge if the unobservable components affected
27
matching but, in contrast to the model, did not affect human capital allocations--that is the
si si coefficients on the ,  in (7), but not those on the $'x , are 0. Although there would in that case be
no selection bias associated with OLS and equation (14) would correctly identify the relevant
parameter values, the bias correction (equation (10)) would still correct for the bias dictated by
si the model and thus yield inconsistent estimates of the coefficients on the $'x . Thus, the
comparison has power against this form of alternative as well.
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For a sample size of 8000 couples in 4000 marriage markets with these parameter values, the 50
simulations indicate that the difference between the male index and selection terms with 10 and
20% random matching are .0737 (s.d.=.0447) and .117 (s.d.=.0428), respectively. These imply
probabilities of 95% and 99.7%, respectively, of rejecting the null of perfect assortative mating
according to the model when the alternative is true.
Note also that in n the case of 100% random matching, the male bias corrected estimate
si and the 8  for both sexes yield an average of zero, which is substantially below the true values of
.2 and .5. Not suprisingly, the OLS coefficients are close to .2 and .5 for men and women
respectively under 100% random matching--in this case no selectivity will be present.
The fact that the parameter estimates from the two approaches are differently affected by
the presence of random matching indicates that the comparison of correction estimates from the
two estimates, and indeed, comparison of the two sets of estimates for the selectivity correction
approach, has some ability to identify misspecification due to inappropriate characterization of
the structure of marriage markets that affects the correlation between observables and
unobservables. The facts that the two approaches in Table 4 yield similar estimates and that the
two components of the selection correction are not significantly different suggests that the
correlations and biases predicted by the developed model are reasonable approximations.
27
The results for the reduced specification, while in some respects less satisfactory,  provideSee the expression following equation (7).
28
Decreases in the male coefficient are, of course, not as easily explained as there is no
29
M reason to expect (  to fall when fewer characteristics on the wife are available. 
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further support for the notion that marriage-market selection effects are significant. They also
provide insight into the extent of bias likely to arise under circumstances in which more
information is available on the pre-marriage household characteristics for one spouse (typically
the husband in a patriarchal society) than the other. 
It is first of all evident from columns (5)-(8) in Table 4 that limiting information on the
women to schooling substantially changes the values of the estimated coefficients relative to
those for the full specification. This difference should be interpreted with care, however. As a
consequence of the fact that the marriage-market estimation does not identify the variance of the
ss i s residual,  the coefficient  on the predicted index $ ’x  increases proportionately with ( .
28
Because less information is available in the reduced specification to predict variation in the
Fi F women’s index, k , the coefficient (  that captures the variation in the women's residual should
increase relative to that in the full specification as, therefore, should  .
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With regard to the extent of bias introduced by the correlation of the regressors with the
residuals, the picture that emerges from the reduced specification is again similar to that in the
full specification. First, based on a comparison of columns (5) and (6) it appears that the
uncorrected estimate overestimates the value of the male coefficient by 55% and underestimates
the value of the female coefficient by 13%.  Second, the coefficient estimates obtained using the
selection terms (column 7) are comparable to those obtained using the simulated data covariances
(column 6). Third, the coefficients on the selection terms are both significantly different from31
zero. 
The only part of the reduced specification that is problematic in view of the model is that,
in contrast to the results of the full specification, the test that the respective index and selection
2 term coefficients are equal is rejected (P =8.28; P-value=0.02).  Apparently the simulated data
2
do not correctly predict the degree of selectivity relative to that which actually obtains in the
desired schooling data. While the exact reason for this misspecification cannot be identified
without further exploration, one possible source is the assumption that, conditional on the
observables, individuals are randomly allocated to marriage markets. Reduction in the observable
information available for some market participants presumably increases the extent to which this
assumption is violated in practice and thus may lead to an underestimate of the degree of
selection operating in the marriage market. 
In summary, while there are some differences in terms of percentage bias in the two
cases, the qualitative implications are the same: marriage-market selection results in
overestimates of the male coefficient  and underestimates of the female coefficient  .
Indeed, given the estimated covariances in Table 3 it may be shown using the bias correction
formulae (10) that the ratio  when   for the full specification and when
for the reduced specification. This result is of potentially significance for the
interpretation of unitary-model tests of the equality of male and female income effects. If, for
example, in an uncorrected regression one finds evidence that the mother's income effect exceeds
that of the father, as is the case for the health equations estimated in Thomas (1990), then theseI assume here for purpose of exposition that the only source of bias is marriage-market
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selection, ignoring, for example, the possibility that an individual's unearned income may be
correlated with his or her tastes. 
This caveat would seem to be of particular relevance in models comparable to the
31
FM reduced specification where, for example,  the ratio $ /$  for incomplete schooling is 1.9. In this
case it is possible that  but that  .
The absolute bias for men is, of course, smaller for the reduced specification. The
32
s. percentage bias is the  relevant figure because it is not influenced by the incidental parameter (
32
patterns of bias suggest that correcting for selectivity will yield an even greater difference.  
30
Two significant caveats must be mentioned, however. (1) The relative magnitudes of the
 estimates in this study for men and women do not necessarily correspond to the relative
si magnitudes of the coefficients on the x  variables, that is  , which is what is being estimated
in a regression of child health or schooling on parental characteristics.  (2) The covariances used
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to calculate the bias apply to a particular marriage market structure and set of observable
covariates and thus are likely to vary across regions and across specifications that include
different observable characteristics.
s Although the model does not permit direct identification of the values of the (
si parameters and thus of the sex-specific variances of the residual components of the k  indices,
the patterns of bias for the two specifications suggest that the dominant source of unobserved
heterogeneity in this model is with respect to the female unobservable. In particular, the finding
of a positive male bias and a negative female bias is consistent with equation (9) under the
assumption of no variance in the male residual discussed above.  The fact that the magnitudes of
the bias in percentage terms  increase in the reduced specification, which effectively increases
32
the variance of the female unobservable, further supports this conclusion. The fact that higher33
female variance should yield greater upward bias for the male coefficient is also evident in Figure
1 which, as noted, assumed built in a higher unobservable standard deviation for women relative
to men by a factor of 3:1. 
Finally, the fact that the estimates of the correlation of observables and unobservables
across couples appear to be internally consistent does not necessarily imply that the notion of
marriage market used here, i.e., those men and women marrying in a particular village in a
particular year, is an accurate characterization of the set of potential partners open to each spouse.
As the selection-correction approach makes clear, the correlation between a given male
observable and a female unobservable and vice-versa is importantly affected by the mean and
variance of the characteristics of other couples in the marriage market. It appears at least possible
that the procedure works because variation in these characteristics at the time and village of
marriage reasonably captures variation in the true marriage market faced by a given man or
woman.  
VI. Conclusions
In this paper I have developed a methodology for looking at the implications of marriage
market structure for analyses of the effects of parental characteristics on desired schooling. This
approach has been implemented using a unique data set from rural Bangladesh that contains
longitudinal information on marriage in a contiguous area that can be linked to censuses
containing information on parental characteristics as well as information on schooling
aspirations. The results show that marriage-market selection has a substantial influence on
estimates of the effects of parental characteristics on desired schooling. In addition to supporting
the notion that human capital investment in children plays an important role in the process ofThis constraint will be removed shortly as an intensive data collection exercise in this
33
population is currently being carried out by the author in collaboration with Jane Menken (U of
Pennsylvania), Omar Rahman (Harvard University), and Paul Gertler (RAND).
34
marriage allocations in this population, the results also indicate that there is substantial
systematic variation in income and/or tastes for human-capital investment that is not captured by
the observed individual and household characteristics.
This paper also has broader implications for analyses of household behavior. As noted in
the introduction, the primary motivation for this particular paper was a concern that the existing
literature testing the unitary model of household behavior has not addressed the potential
selectivity problems that arise if household membership is a choice variable, a problem that
seems especially salient in the context of marriage. The fact that selection effects importantly
influence the estimated desired schooling decision rules suggests that many of the results of this
literature must be interpreted with caution, although it appears that, at least in this population,
biases operate to reduce the probability of finding evidence against the unitary model.
Nonetheless, it would be inappropriate for this paper to be read as a defense of the unitary
model. The structure of the model examined in this paper is that of the collective household.
While expenditure on human capital is not influenced by the structure of the marriage market
except through its effects on the allocation of partners, the model implies that the distribution of
consumption within the household is constrained by the structure of the marriage market (see
Becker 1973). While the limits of the currently available data in this population  do not permit
33
implementation of a test of the effects of marriage market structure on household allocations, the
fact that the model as specified appears to do a reasonable job of characterizing the operation of
the marriage market not only suggests that such effects may well be present but also provides a35
framework for testing for such effects using micro-level information on marriage-market
structure. Indeed, the model presented in this paper may provide a useful framework for






Selectivity Corrected Simulation Estimator
i Let   and w be a vector consisting of the  for s=[M,F], the number of
couples, the  mean and standard deviation of the  indices for all men and women in the
marriage market of individual i, and all second order conditions. Further, let K and W denote
ii matrices of k and w from the actual data and K* and W* the corresponding matrices in the
simulated data. Finally let  and h denote the vector of human capital allocations
in the actual data. Then, if K were fully observable, consistent estimates of a could be obtained
using OLS:
si i or, assuming the ,  are correlated with the w as will be the case given assortative mating, a less
efficient instrumental variables procedure could be used:
As the matrix K is not fully observable, a selectivity corrected simulation estimator is proposed
that involves regressing the K* on W*, constructing predicted values by applying the resulting
coefficients to W, and then regressing h on the resulting predicted values. As the predicted
values may be written  , the proposed estimator is:
Because where  .,  and37
are easily seen to have the same limiting distribution. Thus  consistently estimates a.38
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Data from Marriage Sample
Bride’s HH Land (decimals) 11.57 15.77
Bride’s Schooling  
      1-5 .345 .475
      6+ .012 .107
Bride’s HH Head’s Schooling
     1-5 .312 .464
     6+ .129 .334
Bride’s Age 18.4 3.08
Groom’s HH Land (decimals) 11.41 17.10
Groom’s Schooling
     1-5 .377 0.485
     6+ .154 0.360
Groom’s HH Head’s Schooling
     1-5 .285 .451
     6+ .111 0.314
Groom’s Age 24.75 4.66
Data from 1990 KAP Survey
Achieved Schooling of Children<15 0.236 0.799
Desired Schooling of Children<15 9.461 3.751
Girls .477 0.500
Age 4.899 3.276Table 2
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Human Capital Taste 
Indices Using Actual and Simulated Marriage Data
a
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a. Based on 7892 marriages in 1893 marriage markets.
b. Simulations based on parameter estimates from previous column
c. Asymptotic t-ratios in parenthesesTable 3
Covariances of Predicted Taste Indices and Residuals by Sex and Correction Formulae Based on Simulated Data Sets
a
Full Specification Reduced Specification
(1)
MM i $ ’x
(2)






MM i $ ’x
(6)





Male Predicted Taste Index
MM i ( $ ’x )
3.76 14.97
Female Predicted Taste Index


















Female Residual from Taste














Formulae for corrected estimates given respective covariances
a. Based on 1185 marriages to women from 141 villages.
b. T-ratios based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.Table 4
Estimates of Desired Schooling Decision Rules 
With and Without Corrections for Marriage Market Selectivity
a



































































































































P=0.00a. Based on 2404 children from 1185 marriages to women from 141 villages. Each specification also includes maternal age and age squared
and women’s village dummies.
b. T-ratios derived from heteroskedastic consistent standard errors accounting for multiple observations per woman are reported in
parentheses.Appendix B
OLS Estimates of Residual Conditional on Marriage
Given Own and Marriage Market Characteristics
Male Residual Female Residual
Coefficient Abs. T-ratio Coefficient Abs. T-ratio
MM i 1 $'x 0.240 2.984 0.747 10.015
FF i 2 $ 'x 0.116 0.751 -0.228 1.596
MM i 3 Mean($ 'x ) 0.068 0.705 -0.561 6.250
MM i 4 Mean($ 'x ) -0.217 1.261 0.275 1.726
MM i 5 S.D.($ 'x ) -0.320 2.856 0.148 1.421
FF i 6 S.D.($ 'x ) 0.288 1.486 -0.410 2.279
7 N 0.013 1.682 -0.002 0.258
1 x 1 0.046 3.291 0.017 1.329
1 x 2  -0.011 0.506 -0.061 3.111
1 x 3 -0.003 0.114 0.030 1.204
1 x 4 -0.126 3.324 -0.008 0.219
1 x 5 -0.099 2.555 -0.198 5.536
1 x 6  -0.039 1.249 0.010 0.357
1 x 7 -0.001 0.342 -0.001 0.457
2 x 2 -0.133 3.603 0.051 1.491
2 x 3 -0.057 1.237 0.096 2.246
2 x 4 0.233 2.643 -0.097 1.182
2 x 5 -0.006 0.109 -0.095 1.791
2 x 6 0.176 2.490 0.098 1.488
2 x 7 0.003 0.650 0.001 0.116
3 x 3 -0.072 2.895 -0.069 2.975
3 x 4 0.205 3.549 -0.022 0.402
3 x 5 0.161 3.267 0.226 4.953
3 x 6 -0.015 0.240 -0.078 1.360
3 x 7 -0.022 4.424 0.016 3.551
4 x 4 -0.101 1.411 0.033 0.493
4 x 5 -0.058 0.831 0.054 0.836
4 x 6 -0.201 1.921 -0.011 0.117
4 x 7 0.014 1.757 -0.003 0.475
5 x 5 0.028 0.644 -0.087 2.169
5 x 6 0.016 0.225 0.131 1.994
5 x 7 0.001 0.112 -0.015 2.419
6 x 6  0.154 2.069 0.039 0.567
6 x 7 -0.009 0.724 0.008 0.739
7 x 7  0.001 2.129 0.000 0.102
Constant 0.256 2.401 0.227 2.294
35,  2368 F  =4.38; 
p = 0.000
R  =  0.06
2
35,2368 F =14.96; 
p =  0.000
 R =  0.18
2Figure 1
Simulated Effects of Model Misspecification: Average OLS, Bias Corrected, and Selectivity
Corrected Estimates of Parental Effects on Child Human Capital By Share of Marriage Markets
Assumed to Exhibit Random Matching. True effects are .2 for Males and .5 for Females.